An Experiment to Assess Cost-Benefits of Inspection Meetings and their 
Alternatives by McCarthy, Patricia et al.
An Experiment to Assess Cost-Benets of Inspection Meetings andtheir AlternativesPatricia McCarthy, Adam Porter, Harvey Siy Lawrence VottaComputer Science Department Software Production Research DepartmentUniversity of Maryland AT&T Bell LaboratoriesCollege Park, Maryland 20742 Naperville, Illinois 60566ftrishmcc,aporter,harveyg@cs.umd.edu votta@research.att.comAbstractWe hypothesize that inspection meetings are far less eective than many people believe and that meet-ingless inspections are equally eective. However, two of our previous industrial case studies contradict eachother on this issue. Therefore, we are conducting a multi-trial, controlled experiment to assess the benets ofinspection meetings and to evaluate alternative procedures.The experiment manipulates four independent variables: (1) the inspection method used (two methodsinvolve meetings, one method does not), (2) the requirements specication to be inspected (there are two),(3) the inspection round (each team participates in two inspections), and (4) the presentation order (eitherspecication can be inspected rst).For each experiment we measure 3 dependent variables: (1) the individual fault detection rate, (2) theteam fault detection rate, and (3) the percentage of faults originally discovered after the initial inspectionphase (during which phase reviewers individually analyze the document).So far we have completed one run of the experiment with 21 graduate students in the computer science atthe University of Maryland as subjects, but we do not yet have enough data points to draw denite conclusions.Rather than presenting preliminary conclusions, this article (1) describes the experiment's design and theprovocative hypotheses we are evaluating, (2) summarizes our observations from the experiment's initial run,and (3) discusses how we are using these observations to verify our data collection instruments and to renefuture experimental runs.1 IntroductionFor almost twenty years inspections have been used to validate software. Although software development haschanged substantially in that time, inspections are still performed in much the same way. First each member ofthe review team analyzes the document. Later the team meets to inspect the document as a group. Finally, theauthor repairs the faults that have been discovered.Some researchers, notably Parnas and Weiss [10], have questioned the eectiveness of this approach. Specif-ically, they argued that group meetings are unnecessary, even detrimental, because they add cost and congestdevelopers' already full schedules, yet they nd few very faults.This work is supported in part by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under grant NSG{5123. Mr. Siy was alsopartly supported by AT&T 's Summer Employment Program 1
Draft: August 18, 1995 21.1 Does every inspection need a meeting?Despite these objections many people are convinced that meetings are an essential part of successful inspections.This conviction stands on the argument that (1) many faults are found during meetings, and therefore theyjustify their cost; and (2) because of these meetings more faults are found than would be otherwise. Thus theybelieve that a group of reviewers is likely to be more eective working together than working separately.Votta [14] evaluated this argument in a case study involving 20 design inspections at AT&T. To quantify theusefulness of inspection meetings, he determined the proportion of faults found during the inspection that wereoriginally discovered at the meeting (the meeting gain rate). He reported that the average meeting gain rate forthese inspections was  5%. This would mean that if 20 faults were discovered during the inspection, 19 werealready known before the meeting ever started!This result was striking, but a later data seemed to contradict it. Porter, Siy, Toman and Votta [11] conductedanother study, also at AT&T, involving > 100 code inspections. Although their primary goal was not to studyinspection meetings, they collected data on meeting gains in much the same way that Votta's earlier study had.1This time the average meeting gain rate was 33%, with considerable variance in the observations (i.e., manymeetings produced no gains at all, while some had rates as high as 80%.)We have been unable to nd any simple explanation for these dierences2 , but our attempts to make senseof these results generated hypotheses concerning the relationship between inspection meetings and the entireinspection process. And these hypotheses led us to some practical questions about the most cost-eective waysto conduct inspections.Below we discuss how we arrived at these questions and working hypotheses, describe the design, executionand analysis of an experiment to test them, and discuss the implications of our experimental results.1.2 Digging DeeperObviously, meetings that produce little gain are a large, unnecessary expense, therefore, it is important todetermine exactly how meetings contribute to inspections and whether superior alternatives exist.1We strongly believe that empirical research must be replicated. This experience illustrates an economical way to do this. Weinstrumented the study so that it provided not only the data we were immediately interested in, but also the data needed to replicateVotta's earlier study.2This actually points out a fundamental limitation of case studies. They can be useful for describing a specic process, but they'reoften incapable of explaining dierences among multiple processes because they lack the needed controls.
Draft: August 18, 1995 3To do this we conducted the following analyses: (1) we surveyed several AT&T developers to nd out howthey practiced inspections, and (2) we reanalyzed the eld notes we took from the code inspection study to betterunderstand meeting performance.1.2.1 Surveying DevelopersOne observation we made from the code inspection study was that high meeting gain rates were strongly correlatedwith specic developers. That is, if certain developers were on the inspection team, many faults were found atthe meeting.In talking with developers we learned that, even though inspections always involved an initial phase in whichthey worked individually and a second phase in which they worked as a group, dierent developers carried outthe phases dierently. For one set of reviewers the purposes of the two phases were fault detection and thenfault collection. During the detection phase these reviewers individually analyzed the code to discover faults.The collection meeting was then held primarily to inform code unit's author of these discoveries { not necessarilyto nd more faults.For other reviewers the purposes were preparation and then inspection. During the preparation phasethese reviewers analyzed the code primarily to familiarize themselves with it, and not necessarily to nd faults.This prepared them for the inspection meeting (a group activity), during which they would search for faults.The obvious implication is that reviewers taking the second approach are likely to generate more meetinggains than those taking the rst approach. This raises an important question, \What eect does each approachhave on overall inspection performance?" Again, since meetings are expensive, if the approach that deemphasizesmeetings works just as well, then that might be the most cost-eective option.1.2.2 Analyzing the Field NotesWe also realized that if certain developers tend to produce high meeting gains (no matter which team they'reon), then some factor related to individual eort might explain dierences in gain rates as well as or better thanany characteristics of the meetings themselves (e.g., group synergy or teamwork.)To help us better understand this issue we reanalyzed the eld notes that were recorded during the codeinspection study. Our goal was to nd out how much individual eort or group interaction might account formeeting gains. To examine the eect of synergy, we determined how often a fault was discovered during or
Draft: August 18, 1995 4immediately after group discussions. This is clearly imprecise since synergy might manifest itself in other ways.(For example, early in a meeting the reviewers might learn something that helps them discover a fault much laterin the meeting.) Still, this analysis helps us generate hypotheses even if it doesn't help us prove them.We were able to gather this data on 40% of the inspections. For these we saw that only 30% of meeting gainsgrew out of a visible group discussion. Despite the obvious limitations of this analysis, the results suggest that anon-negligible proportion of the faults discovered at an inspection meeting are found simply because individualsare given a second opportunity to inspect the artifact, not because working in groups enables more eectiveinspection.This hypothesis led to another important question, \How would inspection performance be aected if thetime given to meetings were devoted instead to additional individual analysis?"1.3 Inspection MethodsThe previous discussion suggests three methods for inspecting software. Preparation-Inspection (PI). Each reviewer individually analyzes the artifact in order to become fa-miliar with it. The goal is not to discover faults but only to prepare for the inspection meeting. After allreviewers have completed this Preparation the team holds an Inspection meeting to nd as many faults aspossible. Detection-Collection (DC). Each reviewer individually analyzes the artifact with the goal of Detectingas many faults as possible. As with the PI approach, the team then meets (the Collection phase) to inspectthe document. The results of the collection phase will, of course, contain many faults already found duringthe detection phase. Detection-Detection (DD). Each reviewer individually analyzes the artifact with the goal of Detectingas many faults as possible. After all reviewers complete this rst Detection phase, each is asked to conductfault Detection a second time, again individually, and again with the goal of detecting as many faultsas possible. This approach does not involve a meeting, and instead the time is used by the reviewers tocontinue working individually.
Draft: August 18, 1995 51.4 HypothesisWe hypothesize that inspection meetings are not nearly as cost-benecial as many people believe; and thatinspection methods that eliminate meetings (the DD method) are at least as cost-eective than methods thatrely heavily on them (the PI and DC methods) and probably more so, and that we expect to see this resultbecause we expect the benet of additional individual analysis (as provided by the DD method) to be equal toor greater than holding inspection meetings.2 The ExperimentTo evaluate these hypotheses we designed and conducted a controlled experiment. The goals of this experimentwere twofold: to characterize the behavior of existing approaches and to assess the potential benets of meetinglessinspections. We ran the experiment in the spring of 1995 with 21 subjects { students taking a graduate coursein software engineering { who acted as reviewers. Each complete run consisted of (1) a training phase in whichthe subjects were taught inspection methods and the experimental procedures, and in which they inspected asample SRS; and (2) an experimental phase in which the subjects conducted two inspections.2.1 Experimental Design2.1.1 VariablesThe experiment manipulates four independent variables:1. the inspection method used by each reviewer (PI, DC, or DD);2. the inspection round (each reviewer participating in two inspections during the experiment);3. the specication to be inspected (two are used during the experiment);4. the order in which the specications are inspected (Either specication can be inspected rst.)The inspection method is our treatment variable. The other variables allow us to assess several potentialthreats to the experiment's internal validity. For each inspection we measure three dependent variables:1. the Individual Fault Detection Rate,
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cationRound 1 Round 2WLMS CRUISE WLMS CRUISEInspection PI G B, D E, FMethod DC F C ADD A, E C D GTable 1: This table shows the settings of the independent variables. Each team inspects two documents, theWLMS and CRUISE, one per round, using one of the three inspection methods.2. the Team Fault Detection Rate, 33. the Gain Rate, i.e., the percentage of faults initially identied during the second phase of the inspection.(Forthe PI and DC methods the second phase is the teammeeting; for the DD method it is the second individualdetection activity.)These calculations are explained in Section 3.2.1.2 DesignThe purpose of this experiment is to compare the PI, DC, and DD methods for inspecting software requirementsspecications.When comparing multiple treatments, experimenters frequently use fractional factorial designs. These designssystematically explore all combinations of the independent variables, allowing extraneous factors such as teamability, specication quality, and learning to be measured and eliminated from the experimental analysis.Had we used such a design, each team would have participated in three inspection rounds, reviewing each ofthree specications and using each of three methods exactly once. The order in which the methods are appliedand in which the specications are inspected would have been dictated by the experimental design.However, to keep the duration of the experiment short, we chose a partial factorial design in which each teamparticipates in two inspections, using some combination of the three inspection methods. Table 1 shows thesettings of the independent variables.3The Team and the Individual Fault Detection Rates are the number of faults detected by a team or individual divided by thetotal number of faults known to be in the specication. The closer these values are to 1, the more eective the detection method.No faults were intentionally seeded into the specications. All faults are naturally occurring.
Draft: August 18, 1995 72.1.3 Threats to Internal ValidityA potential problem in any experiment is that some factor may aect the dependent variable without the re-searcher's knowledge. This possibility must be minimized. We considered four such threats: (1) selection eects,(2) maturation eects, (3) instrumentation eects, and (4) presentation eects.Selection eects are caused by natural variation in human performance. For example, random assignment ofsubjects may accidentally create an elite team. Therefore, the dierence in this team's natural ability will maskdierences in the performances of the detection methods.Our strategy is to assign teams and inspection methods on a completely random basis. This approach attemptsto spread dierences in natural ability across the inspection methods in an unbiased fashion. However, since eachteam uses only two of the three inspection methods, dierences in the methods can't be completely separatedfrom dierences in ability.Maturation eects are caused by subjects learning as the experiment proceeds. We have manipulated theinspection method used and the order in which the documents are inspected so that the presence of this eectcan be discovered and taken into account.Presentation eects can occur if inspecting one specication rst makes it easier to inspect the remaining one.We control for this possibility by having half the teams inspect the documents in each of the two possible orders.Finally, instrumentation eects may result from dierences in the specication documents. Such variation isimpossible to avoid, but we controlled for it by having each team inspect both documents.As we will show in Section 3, variation in the fault detection rate is not explained by selection, maturation,or presentation eects.2.1.4 Threats to External ValidityThreats to external validity limit our ability to generalize the results of our experiment to industrial practice.We identied three such threats:1. The subjects in our experiment may not be representative of software programming professionals. Althoughmore than half of the subjects have 2 or more years of industrial experience, they are graduate students,not software professionals. Furthermore, as students they may have dierent motivations for participatingin the experiment.
Draft: August 18, 1995 82. The specication documents we used may not be representative of real programming problems. Our experi-mental specications are atypical of industrial SRS in two ways. First, most of the experimental specicationis written in a formal requirements notation (see Section 2.2). Although several groups at AT&T and else-where are experimenting with formal notations [2, 5], it is not the industry's standard practice. Second,the specications used are considerably shorter than industrial specications.3. The inspection process in our experimental design may not be representative of software developmentpractice. We have modeled our experiment's inspection process after the ones used in many developmentorganizations, although each organization may adapt the process to t its specic needs. Another dierenceis that the SRS authors are not present at our inspections, although in practice they normally would be.Finally, industrial reviewers may bring more domain knowledge to an inspection than our student subjectsdid.To surmount these threats we will need to replicate our experiment using software professionals to inspectindustrial work products. Nevertheless, laboratory experimentation is a necessary rst step because it greatlyreduces the risk of transferring immature technology and it is far less costly than using professional subjectswhile we rene our experimental design.2.1.5 Analysis StrategyOur analysis strategy has several steps. The rst step is to nd those independent variables that individuallyexplain a signicant amount of the variation in the team detection rate. The second step is to evaluate thecombined eect of the variables shown to be signicant in the initial analysis. Both analyses use standardanalysis of variance methods (see [3], pp. 165 and 210 or [6]). Once these relationships were discovered andtheir magnitude estimated, we examined other data, such as the gain rates, that would conrm or reject (ifpossible) a causal relationship between the inspection methods and inspection performance.2.2 Experiment InstrumentationWe used several instruments for this experiment: three small software requirements specications (SRS), instruc-tions for each inspection method, and a data collection form. (These specications were originally developed foranother experiment. See Porter et al.[12].)
Draft: August 18, 1995 92.2.1 Software Requirements SpecicationsThe SRSs we used describe three event-driven process control systems: an elevator control system (ELEVATOR),a water level monitoring system (WLMS), and an automobile cruise control system (CRUISE). Each specicationhas four sections: Overview, Specic Functional Requirements, External Interfaces, and a Glossary. The overviewis written in natural language, while the other three sections are specied using the SCR tabular requirementsnotation [7].For this experiment, all three documents were adapted to adhere to the IEEE suggested format [8]. Allfaults present in these SRS appear in the original documents or were generated during adaptation; no faultswere intentionally seeded into the document. The authors discovered 42 faults in the WLMS SRS and 26 in theCRUISE SRS. The authors did not inspect the ELEVATOR SRS since it was used only for training exercises.Elevator Control System [15] describes the functional and performance requirements of a system for mon-itoring the operation of a bank of elevators (16 pages).Water Level Monitoring System [13] describes the functional and performance requirements of a systemfor monitoring the operation of a steam generating system (24 pages).Automobile Cruise Control System [9] describes the functional and performance requirements for anautomobile cruise control system (31 pages).2.2.2 Fault Reporting FormsWe also developed a Fault Report Form. Whenever a potential fault was discovered { during either the faultdetection or the collection activities { an entry was made on this form. The entry included four kinds ofinformation: Inspection Activity (Detection or Collection), Fault Location (Page and Line Numbers), FaultDisposition (Faults can be True Faults or False Positives), and Fault Description (in prose). A small sample ofa Fault Report appears in Figure 1.2.3 Experiment PreparationThe participants were given two lectures of 75 minutes each on software requirements specications, the SCRtabular requirements notation, inspection procedures, the fault classication scheme, and the lling out of data
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Figure 1: Reviewer Fault Report Form. This is a small sample of the fault report form completed by eachreviewer.collection forms. The references for these lectures were Fagan [4], Parnas [10], and the IEEE Guide to SoftwareRequirements Specications [1]. The participants were then divided into three-person teams { (see Section 2.1.3for details.) Within each team, members were randomly assigned to act as the moderator, the recorder, or thereader during the collection meeting.2.4 Conducting the Experiment2.4.1 TrainingFor the training exercise, each team inspected the ELEVATOR SRS. Individual team members read the specica-tion and recorded all faults they found on a Fault Report Form. Their eorts were restricted to two hours. Laterwe met with the participants and answered questions about the experimental procedures. The ELEVATOR SRSwas not used in the remainder of the experiment.2.4.2 Experimental PhaseThe experimental phase involved two inspection rounds. The instruments used were the WLMS and CRUISEspecications discussed in Section 2.2.1, and the Fault Report Form.
Draft: August 18, 1995 11During the rst Round, three of the seven teams were asked to inspect the CRUISE specication; the remainingfour teams inspected the WLMS specication. Each inspection involved two phases that diered according tothe method used. The inspection methods used by each team are shown in Table 1.The rst phase for the Detection-Collection and Detection-Detection methods lasted up to 2.5 hours, and allpotential faults were reported on the Fault Report Form. The rst phase for the Preparation-Inspection methodtook the same amount of time, but the reviewers were not allowed to report faults or take any notes. After therst phase all materials were collected.4Once a team's members had nished the rst phase, the team moderator arranged for the second phase whichwas also limited to 2.5 hours. This second phase involved a team meeting for the PI and DC methods duringwhich the reader paraphrased each requirement, and the reviewers brought up any issues they had found earlieror had just discovered. The team recorder maintained the team's master Fault Report Form. The DD team didnot hold a second meeting. Their second phase was exactly the same as the rst { individual fault detection.The entire rst Round was completed in one week. The second Round was similar to the rst except that teamswho had inspected the WLMS during Round 1 inspected the CRUISE in Round 2 and vice versa.3 Data and Analysis3.1 DataTwo sets of data are important to our study: the Individual Fault Summaries and the Team Fault Summaries.An individual fault summary shows whether a reviewer discovered a particular fault. This data is gatheredfrom the fault report forms the reviewers completed during fault detection.A team fault summary shows whether a team discovered a particular fault. For the PI and DC methods thisdata is gathered from the fault report forms lled out at the collection meetings. For the DD method the teamsummary is just the set union of faults recorded by all reviewers. This data is used to assess the eectivenessof each fault detection method. Figure 5 depicts the team summaries, showing the fault detection rate andinspection method for each team.One problem with the team summaries is that the DC and PI methods involve meetings, but the DD method4For each round, we set aside 14 2-hour time slots during which inspection tasks could be done. Participants performed each taskwithin a single two-hour session and were not allowed to work at other times.
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Rev . A c t i v i t y S u m 1 2 2 1 3 2 4 1 4 2
1 8 Detection 5 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 9 Detection 6 0 1 • • • 0 • • • 0 • • • 0 0
2 0 Detection 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
T e a m Collection 7 0 1 0 1 0 0Figure 2: Data Collection for each WLMS inspection. This gure shows the data collected from one team'sWLMS inspection (using the DC inspection method). The rst three rows identify the review team members, theinspection methods they used, the number of faults they found, and shows their individual fault summaries. Thefourth row contains the team fault summary. The fault summaries show a 1 (0) where the team or individualfound (did not nd) a fault. Meeting gain and loss rates can be calculated by comparing the individual andteam fault summaries. For instance, fault 21 is an example of meeting loss. It was found by reviewer 18 duringthe fault detection activity, but the team did not report it at the collection meeting. Fault 32 is an example ofmeeting gain; it was rst discovered at the collection meeting.
Rev . A c t i v i t y S u m 1 2 1 4 1 7 2 5 2 6
1 Detection-1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Detection-1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 Detection-1 3 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 Detection-2 1 0 0 • • • 0 • • • 1 • • • 0 0
2 Detection-2 4 0 1 1 0 0 0
3 Detection-2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
T e a m 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0Figure 3: Data Collection for each CRUISE inspection. This gure shows the data collected from oneteam's CRUISE inspection (using the DD inspection method). The data is identical to that of the WLMSinspections except that the CRUISE has fewer faults { 26 for the CRUISE versus 42 for the WLMS.doesn't. Consequently, any meeting losses { faults discovered by individuals before the meeting that don't appearin the team fault report { will lower the fault detection rate for these two methods but not, of course, for theDD method. However, since meeting losses average only about 5% for the DC method (we can't measure themfor the PI method) we consider them to be insignicant. One team's individual and team fault summaries arerepresented in Figure 2 and Figure 3.We also compare the benets of meetings (DC method) with the benets of additional individual analysis (DDmethod). For the DC method we examine the individual and the team summaries to calculate meeting gains.For the DD method we examine the individual summaries to determine whether faults are originally discoveredduring the rst or the second detection activity.Our analysis is done in three steps: (1) We compared the team fault detection rates to ascertain whetherthe inspection methods have the same eectiveness. (2) We separately compared the rst and second round
Draft: August 18, 1995 13






































Figure 4: Fault Detection Rates by Independent Variable. The dashes in the far left column show eachteam's fault detection rate for the WLMS and CRUISE. The horizontal line is the average fault detection rate.The plot demonstrates the ability of each variable to explain variation in the fault detection rates. For theSpecication variable, the vertical location of WLMS (CRUISE) is determined by averaging the fault detectionrates for all teams inspecting WLMS (CRUISE). The vertical bracket, ], to the right of each variable shows onestandard error of the dierence between two settings of the variable.performance of individuals and teams to see how dierent treatments performed. (3) We analyzed the individualfault summaries determine whether dierent treatments found dierent faults.3.2 Analysis of Team PerformanceIf our hypothesis that inspections without meetings are no less than eective inspection with meetings is true, weshouldn't nd that the DD method's performances are signicantly lower than those of the other two methods.Our analysis strategy is to determine whether various threats to the experiment's internal validity can be seen.And then to compare performances.First we analyze each independent variable's contribution to the observed inspection performance data. Table2 and Figure 4 show that Inspection Method and Specication are signicant, but the Round, Order, and TeamComposition are not.Next, we analyzed the combined Instrumentation and Treatment eects. Table 3 shows the input to this anal-ysis. Six of the cells contain the average detection rate for teams using each inspection method and specication
Draft: August 18, 1995 14Independent SST T SSR R (SST =T )(R=SSR) SignicanceVariable LevelDetection Method { treatment .19 2 .13 10 7.34 .01Specication{ instrumentation .14 1 .17 11 9.250 .01Inspection round { maturation .007 1 .31 11 .026 .62Order { presentation .013 1 .240 10 .54 .48Team composition { selection .15 6 .16 6 .912 .54Table 2: Analysis of Variance for Each Independent Variable. This analysis of variance shows that onlythe choice of detection method and specication signicantly explain variation in the fault detection rate.Specication Inspection MethodPI DC DDWLMS .38 .29 .62 .29 .43 .55(average) .38 .29 .47Cruise .19 .12 .23 .077 .27 .19 .42(average) .15 .23 .42Table 3: Team Fault Detection Rate Data. This table shows the nominal and average fault detection ratesfor all 7 teams. There are only 13 observations, however, since one team dropped out because of a team member'sillness.(3 detection methods applied to 2 specications). The results indicate that the interaction between Method andSpecication is not signicant.Finally, we compared the performance of each method. Figure 5 summarizes this data. As depicted, the DDinspection method resulted in the highest fault detection rates (46%), followed by the DC inspection method(23%), and nally by the PI detection method (19%).3.3 Analysis of Second Phase PerformanceThe previous analysis shows that in the current experiment, inspections without meetings seem more eectivethan inspections with meetings. In this section we examine whether the current data support our originalhypothesis that meetingless inspections would be at least as eective because the benets of having a meetingwouldn't outweigh the benets of additional individual analysis.Our analysis strategy is to isolate rst and second phase performances to see how well they explain dierencesin total inspection performance. If the hypothesis is true we should see little dierence between the rst phaseperformances of the DC and DD methods, but signicant dierence in the second phase performances.Figure 6 contains a boxplot showing the number of faults found by each reviewer during the rst phase of theDD and DC inspections. The rates for both the WLMS and the CRUISE appear to be similar.












































































































DD DCFigure 6: Individual Fault Detection Rate (Phase 1). This gure shows the number faults discovered byeach reviewer during the rst phase of a DD or DC inspection.




















































































DD DCFigure 8: Team Fault Detection Rate (Phase 2). This gure shows the number of faults discovered by eachteam during the second phase of a DD or DC inspection.Figure 7 shows the number of unique faults discovered by each team during the rst phase of a DD or DCinspection. This is the set union of faults found by all team members. For the WLMS the rates again appear tobe similar, but for the CRUISE the data is inconclusive.Figure 8 shows the number of unique faults discovered by each team during the second phase of a DC or DDinspection. For the WLMS the rates may be higher for the DD method than for the DC method, but the ratesfor the CRUISE are again inconclusive.
Draft: August 18, 1995 173.4 Analysis of Detection Rates for Specic FaultsEven if inspections with meetings are less eective than inspections without meetings, team meetings might stillbe benecial if they promote detection of classes of faults that individuals seldom or never nd. This sectionanalyzes the individual and team fault summaries to determine whether the current data supports the hypothesisthat this is indeed the case.If this hypothesis is true, then there should be a subset of faults for which the probability of their being foundby the DC and PI methods is greater than by the DD method.For example, 9 faults in the WLMS had a higher detection probability with meetings than without. Therewere 3 such faults in the CRUISE. We want to know whether a subset of these faults can be considered \meetingsensitive".If we knew which faults should be meeting sensitive, we could test whether they are so in this experiment. Forexample, if we had a classication scheme that could distinguish meeting sensitive from meeting insensitive faultswe could separate each specication's faults into two populations and then compare the detection probabilitiesof each population using each inspection method. The faults suspected of being meeting sensitive should have ahigher probability of being found at a meeting.Since at present we don't have any such classication scheme we can't do this and therefore our approach isto look for \markers" or \indicators" that are associated with the presence or absence of meeting sensitive faults.For example, if the detection probabilities of meeting sensitive faults are statistically distinguishable from thoseof meeting insensitive faults, then we can identify those faults which are very likely or very unlikely to be meetingsensitive.To estimate these detection probabilities we conducted a Monte Carlo simulation of inspections under avariety of dierent conditions (e.g., dierent proportions of total faults that are meeting sensitive). The outcomeof each simulation run is the expected detection probabilities for meeting sensitive and insensitive faults whenthe inspection is conducted with and without meetings.This information allows us to answer three questions.1. If none of the faults are meeting sensitive, what is the inter-treatment dierence in detection probabilities?2. As the proportion of meeting sensitive faults grows, how does this aect the inter-treatment dierence indetection probabilities?


























































.34 .38 .42Figure 9: Inter-treatment Dierences for Sensitive and Insensitive Faults. (WLMS) This gure showsa 3  3 matrix of subplots, with each row corresponding to a xed value of pa (.43, .47, or .51) and each columnto a xed value of pb ( .34, .38, and .42). The cells in the matrix contain some of the simulation results for eachcombination of pa and pb. Within each cell the y-axis encodes the inter-treatment dierences for several faultpopulations. Each of these populations has both a meeting sensitive and meeting insensitive subpopulations andis dened by two parameters: the proportion of meeting sensitive faults in the population and the detectionprobability for meeting sensitive faults. The proportion of meeting sensitive faults (0, .2, .4, or .6) is encodedon the subplot's x-axis. Dierent detection probabilities are plotted using dierently shaped symbols ( a squarefor pa  1, an octagon for pa  1:25, a triangle for pa  1:5, and a diamond for pa  1:75). The results forthe meeting sensitive subpopulation are plotted with lled symbols and open symbols are used for the meetinginsensitive subpopulation. The line segments running through each symbol mark one standard deviation in thedetection rate's estimate. Since the detection probabilities of the meeting sensitive and meeting insensitive faultsare constrained by the total detection probability some combinations are mathematically impossible. In thesecases no symbols are plotted.3. At what magnitude does the inter-treatment dierence in detection probabilities become statistically sig-nicant?Each run simulates using two treatments, Ta and Tb, to inspect either the WLMS or CRUISE specication.The fault detection probabilities for each treatment are pa and pb and are based on the probabilities pDD andpDC;PI observed during the experiment.The simulation manipulates ve independent variables:1. the specication (WLMS or CRUISE),
Draft: August 18, 1995 192. the detection rate for Ta. (pa = pDD + f -4, -2, 0, 2, or 4 g factor, where factor = 142 = 0:023 for theWLMS and factor = 126 = 0:038 for the CRUISE),3. the detection rate for Tb. (pb = pDC;PI + f -4, -2, 0, 2, or 4 g factor),4. the proportion of faults that are meeting sensitive (0, .1, .2, .25, .4, .5, .6, .75, .9 or 1 g),5. the detection rate for meeting sensitive defects ( psens = pa f1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.25, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.75, 1.9, or2g. Note that the detection probability for insensitive faults, pinsens, is now constrained by the values ofpb and psens.),For each combination of independent variables we simulate 50 inspections of a single specication. Half ofthe inspections use treatment Ta; the other half use treatment Tb. For Ta, each fault's detection probability isestimated by the proportion of successes in a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution with parameters 25and pa. A similar approach is used for Tb, except that meeting sensitive faults use a Bernoulli distribution withparameters 25 and psens and the insensitive faults use parameters 25 and pinsens. The dierence between thedetection probability for a given fault when using Ta and when using Tb is called the inter-treatment dierence:For each run we calculate two dependent variables:1. the average inter-treatment dierence for meeting sensitive faults,2. the average inter-treatment dierence for meeting insensitive faults.Figures 9 and 10 show some of the simulation results, about which we make several observations. (1) Thelarger the dierence between pa and pb, the smaller the proportion of meeting sensitive faults can be, but theeasier it will be to dierentiate sensitive faults from insensitive ones. (2) The meeting sensitivity will have to beroughly pa1:5 for a statistically signicant dierence to be detectable. (3) In many cases the two populations ofmeeting sensitive and insensitive faults will be statistically indistinguishable from a population having no meetingsensitive faults.4 ConclusionsThis article describes the rst run of a planned multi-trial experiment whose goal is to resolve the conictingresults of two earlier industrial case studies. One of these studies found that inspection meetings consistently


























































0.10 0.18 0.26Figure 10: Inter-treatment Dierences for Sensitive and Insensitive Faults. (CRUISE) For detailedexplanation of the plot see Figure 9.produced few gains, but the other found just the opposite { the gain rates varied widely and could be quite high.This situation illustrates that every empirical study is at best an approximation, needs to be checked againstprevious observations, and dierences resolved through continued experimentation.While attempting to understand the causes of these discrepancies we uncovered anecdotal evidence thatpointed to two possible explanations: (1) dierences in the type of artifact being inspected (design documentsvs. code units) led to the use of dierent \implicit" inspection processes, and (2) faults found at the meetingmight be explained by factors other than meeting synergy or teamwork. Initially we are concentrating on thesecond explanation. Our current observation is that the inspection method used can't be ignored as a signicantsource of variation in the meeting gain rates.In addition to comparing two inspection methods that involved meetings (DC and PI), we also included acontrol treatment that had no inspection meeting (DD) . These meetingless inspections detected more new faultsin the second phase of the inspection than the DC PI methods and more total faults than either.From the perspective of the software practitioner, this outcome suggests that meetings are not necessarilyessential to successful inspections and that further study is warranted.
Draft: August 18, 1995 21Another result of conducting and analyzing the initial experimental run is condence that we are collecting theappropriate data for evaluating our hypotheses. We are also condent that the experimental design is adequatelycontrolling any threats to internal validity.Our primary concern at this time is the need for more data. To address this concern we will replicatethe experiment this fall. We are also constructing a laboratory manual to help other researchers replicate theexperiment as well.
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